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I. INTRODUCTION

Freedom of contract is a longstanding principle deeply rooted
in American jurisprudence, protected by the Contract Clause and by
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the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.'
Because of the legal system's high regard for freedom of contract,
parties are free to negotiate virtually all issues, thus creating rights
and limiting duties and obligations to one another.
In exercising this freedom to contract, parties often negotiate
an arbitration clause. These clauses, also referred to as "predispute
arbitration agreements," are contractual provisions agreed to in
advance of any dispute that require a party to submit any and all
future disputes to arbitration. 2 The American Arbitration
Association's standard arbitration clause, for example, places the
following obligations on the signatories:
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or the breach thereof,
shall be settled by arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association in
accordance with its [applicable] rules and judgment on the award rendered by the
3
arbitrator may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.

Despite the promise to arbitrate, oftentimes one party will
circumvent an arbitration agreement and turn to the traditional
dispute resolution mechanism: litigation. In these situations, the
defendant typically brings the arbitration clause to the court's
attention, asking the court to compel the plaintiff to arbitrate.
Upon being asked to enforce an arbitration agreement, the
court decides whether it is valid to compel the parties to arbitrate.
First, the court must determine whether there is an agreement to
arbitrate. The court must undertake this task first because
"arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to
submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to
submit."4 The gateway question of arbitrability (whether there is a
valid arbitration agreement) is "undeniably an issue for judicial
determination. ' 5 Courts, not arbitrators, therefore scrutinize
1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall.., pass any... Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts); U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV; 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law §§
568, 594 (2006).
2.
F. PAUL BLAND, JR. ET AL., CONSUMER ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS: ENFORCEABILITY AND
OTHER TOPICS 2 (2d ed. 2002).
3.
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, DRAFTING DISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAUSES - A
PRACTICAL GUIDE 5 (1993).
4.
Intergen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 142 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v.
Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986)).
5.
AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 649. The authority stems from the fact that "arbitrators
derive their authority to resolve disputes only because the parties have agreed in advance to
submit such grievances to arbitration." Id. at 648-49. Parties can, howe-7er, agree to submit the
arbitrability question itself to the arbitrator. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514
U.S. 938, 943 (1995). In such a case, a court must defer to the arbitrator's arbitrability decision.
Id. This is a rare circumstance, however: "[Clourts should not assume that the parties agreed to
arbitrate arbitrability unless there is 'clear and unmistakable' evidence that they did so." Id. at
944 (quoting AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 649) (emphasis added).
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arbitration clauses to determine whether the parties intended to agree
to arbitration, which can be evidenced by signature to the contract.
Though a signed arbitration agreement is "the customary
implementation of an agreement to arbitrate,"6 courts recognize that
there are situations in which "a party may be bound by an agreement
to arbitrate even in the absence of a signature." 7 In certain disputes
arising between a signatory to a contract and a nonsignatory, a court
may rule that the arbitration clause binds even the nonsignatory to
arbitrate the dispute. In determining whether the nonsignatory
manifested the requisite intent to arbitrate, courts are "limited only by
8
generally operative principles of contract law."
The particular situations in which a court could compel a
nonsignatory to arbitrate were first synthesized and articulated in
Fisser v. InternationalBank.9 In Fisser, the Second Circuit listed five
principles on which courts had traditionally bound the nonsignatory to
the arbitration clause: (1) assignment of the contract; (2) exercising an
option creating a mutually binding contract to arbitrate; (3) addition
of a party through novation; (4) agency considerations in which the
nonsignatory is "merely the instrumentality of a party bound by the
arbitration clause;" and (5) enforcement by a corporate beneficiary of
an arbitration provision while it was inchoate. 10 In addition to these
five categories, the court articulated a new, sixth category, which
formed the basis for its judgment: the alter ego theory.1 ' Under this
theory, if the nonsignatory is merely the signatory's alter ego, it is "a
proper case to pierce the corporate veil . . . and to hold those
controlling it as one with it."12 This alter ego nonsignatory would be
obligated to specifically perform the signatory's other contractual
obligations, including arbitration. 13
Over the years, courts have grouped these concepts into the
following five categories: (1) incorporation by reference, (2)
assumption, (3) agency, (4) veil-piercing/alter ego, and (5) equitable
estoppel.1 4 While the first four factors are firmly grounded in contract
and agency principles, courts have pushed the equitable estoppel

6.
Sarhank Group v. Oracle Corp., 404 F.3d 657, 662 (2d Cir. 2005).
7.
McAllister Bros., Inc. v. A & S Transp. Co., 621 F.2d 519, 524 (2d Cir. 1980).
8.
Fisser v. Int'l Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 233 (2d Cir. 1960).
9.
Id.
10. Id. at 233 n.6.
11. Id. at 234.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 234-35.
14. See, e.g., Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1995)
(discussing each of the five factors and holding that the plaintiff could not be compelled to
arbitration).
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factor to its outer bounds-so far that it is invalid under general
contract principles.
Courts have developed the principle of equitable estoppel in
two distinct applications. Traditionally, the principle of equitable
estoppel was used to compel a nonsignatory to arbitrate because the
nonsignatory had previously claimed that other provisions of the
contract should be enforced to benefit him. This is the "first strand" of
equitable estoppel and is a proper theory by which the courts can
compel arbitration. 15 Courts, however, have created new applications
of equitable estoppel, allowing a nonsignatory defendant to compel the
signatory to arbitrate. This is the "second strand" of equitable
estoppel. In MS Dealer Service Corp. v. Franklin,1 6 for example, the
Eleventh Circuit articulated two particular applications of the second
strand of equitable estoppel: (1) when the signatory to a written
agreement containing an arbitration clause relied on the written
agreement's terms in asserting its claims against the nonsignatory, or
(2) when the signatory raises allegations of substantially
interdependent and concerted misconduct by both the nonsignatory
and one of the signatories to the contract.1 7 Thus, under the second
strand of equitable estoppel, a close relationship between the
signatory and the nonsignatory may suffice to compel an unwilling
signatory to arbitrate with the nonsignatory,' 8 even though this is not
a contractual relationship.
As this Note argues, however, the application of the second
strand of equitable estoppel is invalid. Certain relationships are so
attenuated as to be outside of the realm of contract and thus
insufficient to compel arbitration. Courts, however, routinely apply
the doctrine of equitable estoppel in this manner. This not only
disregards the most fundamental principle of arbitration-that a
party may only be compelled to arbitrate when he previously agreed to
arbitration-but it also discourages careful drafting of contracts, and
indeed may discourage parties from creating a written document
altogether. Furthermore, it improperly gives a nonsignatory the power
to compel arbitration according to the contract when he has no
contractual relationship to the signatory.

15. Some courts also refer to this as "direct-benefit" estoppel. See, e.g., Hellenic Inv. Fund,
Inc. v. Det Norske Veritas, 464 F.3d 514, 517 (5th Cir. 2006). For the sake of comparing and
contrasting the types of estoppel, however, I will refer to "direct-benefit" estoppel as the first
strand of equitable estoppel.
16. MS Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942 (11th Cir. 1999).
17. Id. at 947; accord Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, 210 F.3d 524, 527 (5th Cir. 2000).
18. See, e.g., Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753 (11th Cir.
1993); McBro Planning & Dev. Co. v. Triangle Elec. Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 342 (11th Cir. 1984).
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This Note will argue that to effectuate parties' objectively
manifested intent, the American judicial system should restructure
the doctrine of equitable estoppel, eliminating the applications that
allow a willing nonsignatory to compel an unwilling signatory to
arbitrate. This does not altogether eliminate equitable estoppel, but
rather ensures that the doctrine is only used where there is truly a
contractual agreement to arbitrate, the fundamental requisite for
compelling arbitration. Furthermore, this guarantees that only parties
entitled to invoke the arbitration clause may do so, thereby redirecting
the focus and application of equitable estoppel to compelling the
nonsignatory, not the signatory, to arbitrate.
In making this argument, Part II will briefly discuss how
arbitration became an alternative to a judicial proceeding in the
United States' courts, why arbitration is often an attractive option,
and how the Federal Arbitration Act allocates issues between the
arbitrator and the courts. Part III will analyze more specifically the
current principles, excluding equitable estoppel, that courts are using
to determine when a nonsignatory may be compelled to arbitrate.
These four principles, as this Note will argue, are properly grounded
in contract and agency law and are a valid means for compelling a
nonsignatory to arbitrate. Part IV will then focus on the principle of
equitable estoppel, undertaking a detailed analysis of both strands. In
so doing, this Note will argue that courts invalidly use the second
strand of equitable estoppel to compel a signatory to arbitrate with a
nonsignatory against the signatory's will. This is not a valid contract
or agency principle and therefore directly subverts the Federal
Arbitration Act on its face. Part V will then propose eliminating the
strand of equitable estoppel used to compel an unwilling signatory
plaintiff to arbitrate with a willing nonsignatory. Doing so would
result in a more streamlined and tailored standard that will require a
contractual agreement to arbitrate, thereby realigning the analysis
with the requirements of the Federal Arbitration Act and
accompanying case law.

II. BACKGROUND: ARBITRATION IN AMERICA AND THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT

A. Background and Scope
The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")' 9 was enacted in 1925
without opposition. 20 The lack of opposition resulted from the
19.

9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, 201-208 (2006).
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universal understanding that the statute was intended to be
procedural in nature and applicable only in federal courts. 21 However,
the landmark case Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 22 ultimately
23
transformed the FAA into a substantive, national regulatory statute.
Because the constitutional foundation of the FAA has now shifted
from congressional power to control federal courts to congressional
power to regulate commerce, 24 the FAA supersedes state law under
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and is
25
applicable in both state and federal court.
The FAA is limited to the subject matter over which the federal
government unquestionably has substantive constitutional power:
commerce and maritime matters. 26 Section 3 stays litigation pending
arbitration, 27 while § 4 is the all-important mechanism whereby courts
can compel parties "to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the
28
terms of the agreement."
Various other sections supplement the implementation of these
basic principles of full enforceability by providing for judicial
appointment of arbitrators, conferring power on the arbitrators to
summon witnesses, and granting courts the power to issue orders
confirming awards. 29 The statute also contains regulatory provisions,
which specify grounds for vacating and modifying arbitration
awards. 30 Ultimately, the FAA is an "unquestionably integrated,
unitary statute, consisting of core provisions and provisions
3
supplementing them." '
The most important provision in the FAA, however, is § 2,
which establishes a presumption in favor of arbitration: Contracts

20. IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN
INTERNATIONALIZATION 115 (1992).

21.
22.

ARBITRATION LAW:

REFORMATION,

NATIONALIZATION,

Id. at 83, 109-20.
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
23. MACNEIL, supra note 20, at 135.
24. In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conkling Manufacturing Co., the Supreme Court held
that congressional authority to prescribe the federal courts' authority over arbitration
agreements is under the Commerce Clause. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 395, 405 (1967) (quoting legislative history).
25. See, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 126 S. Ct. 1204, 1209
(2006); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25-26 n.34 (1983); MACNEIL, supra note 20, at 149. For a
more complete discussion on how Erie ultimately transformed the FAA, see MACNEIL, id. at 13455.
26. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2006).
27. 9 U.S.C. § 3.
28. 9 U.S.C. § 4.
29. MACNEIL, supra note 20, at 103.
30. Id. at 104. "
31. Id. at 105-06.
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including an arbitration clause "shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable" unless a court finds that they must be invalidated per
typical "grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract." 32 Thus, courts use traditional contract principles to
determine whether an arbitration clause is enforceable. As will be
discussed below, courts often extend these principles to nonsignatories
to the contract.
B. Why ArbitrationIs an Attractive Option
The FAA fueled the growth of arbitration in the United States,
providing an attractive alternative to the traditional litigation
proceeding. The American Arbitration Association ("AAA"), founded in
1926, has thirty-five offices in the United States and Ireland and
employs over 8000 arbitrators and mediators. 33 In 2004, the AAA
heard over 159,000 cases. 34 Arbitration clauses are now standard in
most commercial contracts.
Commercial parties find arbitration attractive for several
reasons. Perhaps the main reason corporations want to arbitrate is
the effective limitation of exposure to large damage awards, including
a dramatic reduction in punitive damage awards, because arbitrators
tend to impose smaller amounts. 35 Arbitration is also geared to result
in "the final disposition of differences between parties in a faster, less
expensive, more expeditious, and perhaps less formal manner than is
available in ordinary court proceedings." 36 Likewise, arbitration is
attractive because the parties have the mutual capacity to select the
arbitrator, who most likely will bring specialized expertise to the
proceeding that the typical judge and lay jury cannot. 3 7 Corporations
also prefer arbitration for strategic reasons. An arbitrator is neither
publicly chosen nor publicly accountable. 38 Furthermore, in most
commercial cases the arbitrator is not required to give a reasoned
explanation of the result, and arbitrators commonly provide no
written explanation for their decisions. 39 In general, an arbitrator
32.
33.

9 U.S.C. § 2.
American Arbitration Association, Fast Facts, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=26078.

34.

Id.

35.

4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative Dispu6te Resolution §§ 3, 7 (2006).

36.

4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 8 (2006).

37. Id. It would, however, "appear sufficient that the arbitrators have at least a generalized
LARRY E. EDMONSON, 1 DOMKE ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 25:2 (3d
knowledge of the field ....
ed. 2006).
38. Id.
39. Id. §§ 177, 180. Courts do not have jurisdiction to set aside arbitration awards unless
one of two conditions is met: either it is stipulated that the arbitrators should follow legal rules
of procedure, id. § 177, or a statute applicable to the case prescribes rules, id. §§ 177, 180. Some
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need not follow the rules of procedure and evidence. 40 The scope of
discovery is within the arbitrator's discretion and often is extremely
limited: though arbitrators are not precluded from ordering discovery,
parties agreeing to arbitrate their claims generally relinquish their
right to pretrial discovery or to subpoena documents (absent extreme
circumstances). 4 1 Limiting discovery in this manner can lead to a
great reduction in costs. Finally, because of the FAA's restriction on
the ability to appeal an erroneous interpretation of the law,
42
arbitrators can effectively ignore statutes and judicial precedent.
These potential benefits, however, may also be seen as
drawbacks because they compromise procedural protections available
in court. Indeed, any of the aforementioned strategic reasons to
proceed in an arbitral forum may be seen as a disadvantage to a party
who prefers the procedural safeguards of traditional litigation. For
example, the capacity to select the arbitrator may lead to a bias in
favor of repeat players, in part because many arbitrators compete to

commentators have noted that there are two schools of thought regarding evidentiary standards.
One school of thought views arbitration as primarily a private mechanism and thus believes the
arbitrator is not bound by evidentiary rules. In contrast, the opposing school of thought believes
that the arbitrator is nevertheless bound to the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
requires the arbitrator to provide a fair and adequate hearing with opportunities to present their
respective evidence and argument. MARVIN F. HILL, JR. & ANTHONY V. SINICROPI, EVIDENCE IN
ARBITRATION 3-4 (2d ed. 1989). Even so, the latter school of thought recognizes that arbitrators
are not bound by evidentiary rules, even if they do adopt them as a prudential matter. Id. at 4.
40. 4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 177 (2006); EDMONSON, supra note 36, §
1:1. Arbitrators may still order discovery to "preserve notions of fairness and to comport with a
party's due process rights." 4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 187; see 9 U.S.C. § 7
(2006).
41. 4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 6 (2006).
42. See id. § 180 ("[U]nless it is stipulated that the arbitrators should follow legal rules of
procedure, the courts have no jurisdiction to set aside an award for failure of the arbitrators to
follow court rules."); EDMONSON, supra note 36, § 1.1 ("Arbitration tribunals are not generally
Unless so required by parties, arbitrators
required to apply principles of substantive law ....
give no reason for their decision, and the award is generally not open to review by courts for any
error in finding facts and applying law."). This is not to say, however, that a court can never
vacate an award. A federal court may vacate an award
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by
or
prejudiced;
have
been
party
of any
rights
the
which
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006). The same avenue for appeal does not exist, however, for mere mistakes as
to law or fact.
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be selected by the parties to arbitrations. 43 If arbitrators rule against
44
these corporations too frequently, they risk losing their business.
Parties aware of this bias may choose to exploit it in their favor.
Despite these drawbacks, however, arbitration is gaining in
popularity, and many parties agree ex ante to arbitrate any and all
future claims that may arise between them.
C. How the Statute Operates
In addition to articulating when a claim is arbitrable and
establishing a policy in favor of arbitrability, 4 5 the FAA "set[s] out a
comprehensive integrated modern arbitration law containing
everything needed for a complete system of arbitration, other than the
basic contract law necessarily underlying any such system."46 The
federal statute may implement the system governing arbitration once
an agreement to arbitrate has been established, but the initial
question of whether agreement exists is a matter of common law
contract principles. Because arbitration is contingent on this
agreement, "a party who has not agreed to arbitrate will normally
have a right to a court's decision about the merits of its dispute."47 The
gateway question of arbitrability (whether there was an agreement to
arbitrate) is generally for the courts to determine. 48 This agreement to
arbitrate is explicitly evidenced when both parties are signatories to a
contract containing an arbitration clause. But when the dispute over
arbitrability involves a nonsignatory to the contract, the matter
becomes far more complicated. The mere fact that one of the parties
did not sign the contract containing the arbitration clause does not
foreclose the possibility of arbitration. Because arbitration is a
"creature of contract law," courts asked to compel a nonsignatory to
arbitrate under an arbitration agreement analyze whether the

43.

BLAND ETAL., supra note 2, at 4.

44. Id.
45. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (establishing the validity of an arbitration clause "save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity").
46. MACNEIL, supra note 20, at 102.
47. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) (emphasis added); see
supra note 5 and accompanying text. Questions as to the validity of the contract as a whole, and
not specifically the arbitration provisions, are to be considered by an arbitrator. Buckeye Check
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 126 S.Ct. 1204, 1209 (2006). Arbitration clauses,
however, are severable from the remainder of the contract, and challenges as to the validity of
arbitration clauses are to be heard by courts. Id. This Note only addresses the question of
whether an agreement to arbitrate exists, not whether the contract as a whole is valid.
48. AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns. Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986).
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III. ANALYSIS: THE FOUR LEGITIMATE PRINCIPLES USED TO COMPEL
NONSIGNATORIES TO ARBITRATE
Because the question of arbitrability is a matter of contract,
arbitrability "is undeniably an issue for judicial determination.., to
be decided by the court, not the arbitrator." 50 The circuit courts of
appeals review de novo the decisions of the district courts regarding
arbitrability, 51 analyzing the claim using a five-part framework that
consists of "theories aris[ing] out of common law principles of contract
and agency law" 52 applicable in the arbitration context. There are five
general contract and agency principles by which a court may bind
nonsignatories to arbitration: (1) incorporation by reference; (2)
assumption; (3) agency; (4) veil-piercing/alter ego; and (5) estoppel. 53
Estoppel typically entails equitable estoppel, which "precludes
a party from enjoying rights and benefits under a contract while at the
same time avoiding its burdens and obligations." 54 Traditionally, this
doctrine was used to estop nonsignatories from asserting that their
lack of signature on the contract precluded enforcement of the
arbitration clause while simultaneously claiming rights and benefits
under the contract. 55 Via the application of the second strand,
however, the equitable estoppel doctrine is used to estop signatories,
rather than nonsignatories. "Willing" nonsignatories (defendants in a
suit who file motions to compel arbitration) may compel "unwilling"
signatories (the plaintiffs against whom the motions are filed) to

49. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin Intermediates, S.A.S.,
269 F.3d 187, 194-95 (3d Cir. 2001).
50. AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 649.
51. See, e.g., Bouriez v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 359 F.3d 292, 294 (3d Cir. 2004) ("We
exercise plenary review over the District Court's order compelling arbitration."); Sunkist Soft
Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 756 (11th Cir. 1993) ("We review de novo the
district court's order compelling arbitration."). But see Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C.,
210 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 2000) ("Accordingly, whether to utilize equitable estoppel in this
fashion is within the district court's discretion; we review to determine only whether it has been
abused."); Int'l Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen GMBH, 206 F.3d 411, 416 (4th
Cir. 2000) ("We review factual findings that form the basis of a decision as to whether the parties
have agreed to submit a dispute to arbitration for clear error."). Because the application of
contract law principles to determine arbitrability is a question of law and not of fact, the proper
standard for review is de novo.
52. Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1995).
53. See, e.g., Hellenic Inv. Fund, Inc. v. Det Norske Veritas, Inc., 464 F.3d 514, 517 (5th Cir.
2006); Thomson-CSF,64 F.3d at 776.
54. Intergen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 145 (1st Cir. 2003).
55. Int'l Paper, 206 F.3d at 417-18.
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arbitrate their dispute. As this Note argues below, this is an invalid
basis for compelling arbitration, as it does not follow traditional
contract principles.
To illustrate why the second strand of equitable estoppel does
not fit within traditional contract principles, it is helpful to
understand first why the other methods are valid under these
principles. The following Sections will explain the various contract
and agency principles used both to bind a nonsignatory to arbitration
and, in the case of equitable estoppel, to bind a signatory to arbitrate
with a nonsignatory against the signatory's will.
A. Incorporation by Reference
Under the incorporation by reference theory, a signatory to a
preexisting contract may compel arbitration against a nonsignatory
when the two parties entered into a new contract that incorporated
the first contract by reference. Furthermore, "[a] nonsignatory may
compel arbitration against a party to an arbitration agreement when
that party has entered into a separate contractual relationship with
56
the nonsignatory which incorporates the existing arbitration clause."
This theory, though it allows a nonsignatory to compel a signatory, is
consistent with the requirement of an agreement to arbitrate because
parties who were not privy to the first contract effectively become
signatories thereto by incorporating the preexisting contract into their
new contract. To better illustrate why incorporation by reference is
valid, let us imagine a situation between two parties in which the
parties incorporate a preexisting contract containing an arbitration
clause into a newly negotiated contract. For example, imagine a
situation in which two parties, A and B, negotiated a contract
containing an arbitration clause. Party B then negotiates a new
contract with Party C, incorporating the preexisting contract by
reference. One can call the prior contract "Contract 1" and the second
contract incorporating the prior contract by reference "Contract 2."
When Contract 1 is incorporated by reference into Contract 2,
Contract l's arbitration clause becomes part of Contract 2. As a
signatory to Contract 2, Party C effectively becomes a signatory to the
contract containing the arbitration clause. In a dispute arising
between B and C, therefore, either party could compel the other to
arbitrate. 57 Furthermore, when incorporating by reference, parties can

56. Thomson-CSF,64 F.3d at 777.
57. Naturally, in a dispute arising between A and B, either party could compel the other to
arbitration, as both parties are (explicitly) signatories to the contract containing the arbitration
clause.
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choose to incorporate the contract in its entirety or to incorporate only
certain clauses. Therefore, if either party objected to the arbitration
clause, that part of Contract 1 should have been explicitly not
incorporated.
The theory of incorporation by reference should thus encourage
careful contract negotiations in which parties pay attention to every
detail of what is being incorporated via reference to the prior contract.
Because of the parties' freedom to negotiate every detail, including
whether any portions of the contract will not be incorporated by
reference, a party to a contract that incorporates a prior contract
containing an arbitration clause cannot refuse arbitration.
B. Assumption
A nonsignatory may also be bound by the arbitration clause if
the nonsignatory's subsequent conduct indicates that it has assumed
the obligation to arbitrate. 58 For example, in Gvozdenovic v. United
Air Lines, Inc.,59 appellants contended that the district court
improperly dismissed their petition for vacatur of the arbitration
award because they were not signatories to the contract containing the
arbitration agreement. 60 The Second Circuit refused to accept
appellants' arguments. Because the nonsignatories had participated
voluntarily and actively in the arbitration, they were bound by its
61
outcome.
The theory of assumption is consistent with traditional
contract principles. When assuming a contract, the right to later claim
nonsignatory status is effectively waived: "[P]articipation in an
arbitration proceeding on the merits of a dispute will result in waiver
of the right to raise the issue of arbitrability."62 Traditional principles
of contract law suggest that parties should not be allowed to act
inconsistently or renege on their given word to the detriment of the
other party. Refusing to allow parties to act in such an inconsistent
and potentially deceptive manner encourages the parties to be honest
and forthright in their relations. If the nonsignatory does not desire
arbitration, then it needs to make that objectively clear, rather than
acting in a manner consistent with willingness to arbitrate. Contract
principles do not presume mind-reading abilities, and if the parties
subjectively intend one result, then it is their responsibility to
58. Id.
59. Gvozdenovic v. United Air Lines, Inc., 933 F.2d 1100 (2d. Cir. 1991).
60. Id. at 1103.
61. Id.
62. Eleanor L. Grossman, Annotation, Participationin ArbitrationProceedingsAs Waiver of
Objections to Arbitrability Under State Law, 56 ALR 5th 757, 767 (1998).
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manifest that intent on an objective level. If both the nonsignatory
and the signatory have evidenced a willingness to arbitrate, then
there is no question as to arbitrability, and the arbitration may
proceed.
C. Agency
Traditional principles of agency law may bind a nonsignatory
principal to an arbitration agreement when the signatory agent acted
63
within the principal's actual, implied, or apparent authority. It
should come as no surprise that a principal, though technically a
nonsignatory, may be bound to a contract that his agent signed on his
behalf. An important characteristic of agency law is that "the agent
has the power to bring about or alter business and legal relationships
between the principal and third persons and between the principal
and agent."64 This power emanates from the " 'manifestation of
consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf
and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.' "65 A
principal is bound by the actions of his general agent "within the
apparent scope of business for which the agent is employed." 66 Thus a
nonsignatory principal can be compelled to arbitrate when his agent,
acting in the scope of authority granted by the principal, signs a
contract containing an arbitration clause.
D. Veil-Piercing/AlterEgo
A fourth theory by which courts will compel a nonsignatory to
arbitrate is the veil-piercing theory, also known as the alter ego
theory. Typically, the subsidiary of a parent company is a separate
legal entity, and thus the parent company cannot be held liable for the
subsidiary's actions-in other words, "a corporate relationship alone is
not sufficient to bind a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement."6 7 In
certain situations, however, the relationship between the two entities
is such that the court will "pierce the corporate veil" and hold the
parent company liable for the subsidiary's actions. This occurs "in two
broad situations: to prevent fraud or other wrong, or where a parent
dominates and controls a subsidiary." 68 This theory is closely related
63.
64.
65.

Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 64 F.3d 773, 777 (2d Cir. 1995).
3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 2 (2002).
Bridas Sapic v. Turkmenistan, 345 F.3d 347, 357 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1958)).
66.

3AM. JUR. 2DAgency § 83(2002).

67.
68.

Thomson-CSF, 64 F.3d at 777.
Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).
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to the agency strand, for the parent/subsidiary relationship is very
similar to the principal/agent relationship.
Courts will only pierce the corporate veil in egregious
circumstances. To pierce the veil to reach the parent company, the
parent's domination and control of the subsidiary must be so complete
that the two are virtually one and the same-the subsidiary is the
mere instrumentality of the parent corporation. Courts make this
determination by analyzing the facts and circumstances of the case.
Factors considered may include:
(1) the absence of the formalities and paraphernalia that are part and parcel of the
corporate existence, i.e. issuance of stock, election of directors, keeping of corporate
records and the like, (2) inadequate capitalization, (3) whether funds are put in and
taken out of the corporation for personal rather than corporate purposes, (4) overlap in
ownership, officers, directors, and personnel, (5) common office space, address and
telephone numbers of corporate entities, (6) the amount of business discretion displayed
by the allegedly dominated corporation, (7) whether the related corporations deal with
the dominated corporation at arm's length, (8) whether the corporations are treated as
independent profit centers, (9) the payment or guarantee of debts of the dominated
corporation by other corporations in the group, and (10) whether the corporation 6 in
9
question had property that was used by other of the corporations as if it were its own.

A party attempting to pierce the corporate veil thus must meet
a heavy burden and demonstrate a relationship greater than mere
ownership. America's corporate laws were specifically designed for the
purpose of limiting liability; courts therefore impose a high hurdle on
a party attempting to thwart this purpose and pierce the corporate
veil. According to a recent decision by the Second Circuit,
To hold [companies to a lower control standard] would defeat the ordinary and
customary expectations of experienced business persons. The principal reasons
corporations form wholly owned. . . subsidiaries is to insulate themselves from liability
for the torts and contracts of the subsidiary ....
The practice of dealing through
a
70
subsidiary is entirely appropriate and essential to our nation's conduct of ... trade.

The doctrine of veil-piercing is firmly embedded in American
contract and corporate law and is therefore a normal tool in the
arsenal of contract interpretation principles used to determine
whether a nonsignatory can be compelled to arbitrate. Courts will
pierce the corporate veil and compel a nonsignatory parent
corporation to arbitrate upon the requisite showing of complete control
and domination. They will do so because such control suggests that, in
essence, the parent company itself signed the arbitration clause, even
if it is technically the subsidiary's signature on the form.

69. Carte Blanche (Singapore) Pte., Ltd. v. Diners Club Int'l, Inc., 2 F.3d 24, 26 (2d Cir.
1993) (citations omitted). It should be noted, however, that corporate law is a matter of state law
and may vary from state to state.
70. Sarhank Group v. Oracle Corp., 404 F.3d 657, 662 (2d. Cir. 2005).
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often blur the line between the
Courts, however,
parent/subsidiary context and equitable estoppel, allowing defendant
parent companies to invoke the arbitration clause signed by their
subsidiaries. As the Fourth Circuit noted,
When the charges against a parent company and its subsidiary are based on the same
facts and are inherently inseparable, a court may refer claims against the parent to
arbitration even though the parent is not formally a party to the arbitration
agreement .... "If the parent corporation was forced to try the case, the arbitration
proceedings would be rendered meaningless and the federal policy in favor of arbitration
effectively1 thwarted." The same result has been reached under a theory of equitable
7
estoppel.

Because these results may be reached under a theory of
equitable estoppel (i.e., a nonsignatory defendant may compel the
signatory plaintiff), courts sometimes improperly collapse the two
factors to compel arbitration. 72 Courts must be extremely careful,
however, not to compel parties who did not agree to arbitrate their
claims to arbitrate. Despite the federal policy in favor of arbitration,
courts can only compel arbitration by those parties who agreed to
arbitrate in the first place, either by written agreement or contract
and agency principles. 73 Therefore, when a nonsignatory parent
company willingly agrees to arbitrate with a signatory who has filed
suit against it in court-a so-called "defensive" use of veil-piercing in
that the parent company volunteers to pierce the corporate veil 74-the

71. J.J. Ryan & Sons, Inc. v. Rhone Poulenc Textile, S.A., 863 F.2d 315, 320-21 (4th Cir.
1988) (quoting Sam Reisfeld & Son Import Co. v. S.A. Eteco, 530 F.2d 679, 681 (5th Cir. 1976))
(citation omitted). In this case, plaintiff J.J. Ryan & Sons, Inc. was the assignee of contracts with
affiliates of defendant Rhone Poulenc Textile, S.A. Id. at 316. Rhone Poulenc, even though a
nonsignatory to the contracts, was willing to arbitrate with J.J. Ryan & Sons. Id. at 320. The
Fourth Circuit agreed with Rhone Poulenc simply because the parent was willing to arbitrate,
even though the court did not analyze whether the parent and subsidiary were virtually one and
the same. Id. at 320-21.
72. See infra Part IV B.2.. Scott M. McKinnis has argued that the Sunkist case, discussed
infra text accompanying notes 86-98, was an appropriate use of the second strand of equitable
estoppel. Scott M. McKinnis, Enforcing Arbitration with a Nonsignatory:Equitable Estoppel and
Defensive Piercing of the Corporate Veil, 1995 J. DISP. RESOL. 197, 210-11. McKinnis argues,
however, that the court "missed an excellent opportunity to step beyond the esoteric language of
estoppel and base its equitable decision on the established rule of corporate instrumentality and
alter ego doctrine." Id. at 211 (emphasis added). McKinnis argues that in situations with a
signatory-plaintiff and a nonsignatory-defendant, the court could "defensively" pierce the
corporate veil and compel the signatory "to arbitrate its claims with a nonsignatory parent." Id.
This inappropriately collapses the two factors by substituting a so-called equitable principle for
the principle of veil-piercing and allowing a nonsignatory who is not entitled to invoke the clause
and who did not agree to arbitrate, either by contract or agency principles, to compel arbitration.
Moreover, to the extent that the court fails to do an analysis for domination and control, this is in
effect the second strand of equitable estoppel, an inappropriate basis for compelling arbitration.
73. Intergen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 142 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v.
Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986)).
74. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
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court should first analyze domination and control.7 5 This analysis
should seek to determine whether the parent and subsidiary are
virtually the same entity, thus rendering the parent an effective
signatory. If not, a nonsignatory parent company's willingness to
arbitrate should not trump the signatory's desire to remain in court
because it is not clear that the parent and subsidiary are one and the
same. Without such domination and control, the situation is in fact the
second strand of equitable estoppel, which this Note argues is an
76
inappropriate basis for compelling arbitration.
IV. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
The current equitable estoppel analysis is by far the most
disjointed theory used under the framework because the circuits do
not uniformly apply it. Furthermore, the theory moves farthest away
from traditional contract interpretation principles, thus potentially
compelling arbitration where no agreement to arbitrate exists. This
differs from the other four contract and agency principles used to
compel arbitration. Under the other four principles, both parties have
objectively manifested the intent to arbitrate.
Courts have used the term "equitable estoppel" to encompass
two distinct versions of the doctrine: the first and second strands. As
discussed in the following Sections, the first strand is based in valid
contractual principles and is therefore a valid basis by which to
compel a nonsignatory to arbitrate. The second strand, however, is not
well-grounded in contract principles. Under the second strand, given
that contractual principles cannot deduce an objective agreement
between the parties, there is no valid basis by which to compel the
parties to arbitrate.
A. The FirstStrand
The first strand of equitable estoppel examines the nature of
77
the relationship between the nonsignatory and the contract itself.
Most courts recognize that "a party may be estopped from asserting
that the lack of his signature on a written contract precludes
enforcement of the contract's arbitration clause when he has
consistently maintained that other provisions of the same contract

75. See Carte Blanche (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. v. Diners Club Int'l, Inc., 2 F.3d 24, 26 (2d Cir.
1991) (listing factors considered in a factual analysis of whether the parent company controlled
the subsidiary such that they are legally considered the same).
76. See discussion infra Parts III.D, IV.
77. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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should be enforced to benefit him."7 8 Thus, a nonsignatory may be
"equitably estopped from challenging an agreement that includes an
arbitration clause when that person embraces the agreement and
directly benefits from it." 79 In other words, if a nonsignatory were to
sue on the contract, the signatory could invoke equitable estoppel and
compel the nonsignatory to arbitrate the dispute. This particular use
of equitable estoppel accords with contract principles and the parties'
manifested intent. By relying on provisions of the contract to form a
claim, the nonsignatory has manifested an objective intent to be bound
by the contract, even if subjectively he did not intend such. Objective
intent is the central focus of contract law. Courts look for "an
agreement to arbitrate, under general principles of contract law...
that is to say that the totality of the evidence supports an objective
intention to agree to arbitrate."80 Furthermore, the focus remains on
the unwilling nonsignatory to arbitrate its claims. The first strand is
therefore rooted in traditional contract principles and is used validly
to compel a nonsignatory to arbitrate.
B. The Second Strand
The term "equitable estoppel" is also used to describe a theory
that examines the nature of the relationships between the partiesthe "second strand" of equitable estoppel. Courts that follow the
second strand purport that a close relationship between the parties
involved, coupled with a dispute closely related to the underlying
contractual obligations, may be a basis to compel arbitration.8 1 Under
this theory, the doctrine of so-called equitable estoppel may allow a
nonsignatory to compel a signatory to arbitrate.8 2 In other words,
"when a signatory resists arbitration, courts may use equitable
estoppel to join a 'willing' nonsignatory to a proceeding where

78. Int'l Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen GMBH, 206 F.3d 411, 418 (4th
Cir. 2000).
79. Bouriez v. Carnegie Mellon Univ, 359 F.3d 292, 295 (3d Cir. 2004); accord Int'l Paper,
206 F.3d at 418.
80. Sarhank Group v. Oracle Corp., 404 F.3d 657, 662 (2d Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).
81. See, e.g., Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 757 (11th Cir.
1993).
82. Some courts find that the second strand is distinct and separate from the other contract
and agency principles used to compel arbitration of a nonsignatory because it is the
nonsignatory, and not the signatory, who seeks to invoke the clause. See, e.g., Choctaw
Generation Ltd. P'ship v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 271 F.3d 403, 406 (2d Cir. 2001). Usually,
however, courts include the second strand in the context of the five principles because it is an
estoppel theory. Even if courts such as the Second Circuit find that it is separate from the
framework, they still analyze it in conjunction with the framework. Thus it is a (slight)
distinction without a difference.
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arbitration between the underlying signatory participants is
83
appropriate."
This Section will first discuss various examples of how the
circuit courts have applied the second strand of equitable estoppel. It
will then explain various nuances of its application, including how
courts have improperly collapsed the second strand with the principle
of veil-piercing/alter ego, how the second strand has been applied
improperly when a claim sounds in tort, how the second strand is
distinct from the first, and why the second strand of equitable estoppel
is wholly invalid, despite the federal policy in favor of arbitration.
1. Evolution of the Second Strand in the Federal Circuit Courts of
Appeals
Equitable estoppel is a rather nebulous principle, perhaps due
to its shaky status as a principle of contract law. The Eleventh Circuit,
however, has articulated the two situations in which a nonsignatory
can compel the signatory to arbitrate:
First, equitable estoppel applies when the signatory to a written agreement containing
an arbitration clause must rely on the terms of the written agreement in asserting its
claims against the nonsignatory.... Second, application of equitable estoppel is
warranted when the signatory [to the contract containing the arbitration clause] raises
by both the
allegations of substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct
84
nonsignatory and one or more of the signatories to the contract.
85

The Fifth Circuit has explicitly adopted this theory.
These two sub-parts of the second strand of equitable estoppel
build upon the Eleventh Circuit's analysis in Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc.
v. Sunkist Growers, Inc.8 6 In Sunkist, defendant-appellant Sunkist
Growers, Inc. ("Sunkist") sold to General Cinema Corporation ("GCC")
"the right to market and sell an orange soda under the 'Sunkist' brand
name. 8 7 To produce and market the soft drink, GCC created a whollyowned subsidiary, Sunkist Soft Drinks ("SSD").88 SSD and Sunkist
subsequently entered into a license agreement that included an
arbitration clause.8 9 Del Monte Corporation ("Del Monte") later bought
SSD from GCC and absorbed SSD into its own beverage products
83. David F. Sawrie, Equitable Estoppel and the Outer Boundaries of Federal Arbitration
Law: The Alabama Supreme Court's Retrenchment of an Expansive Federal Policy Favoring
Arbitration, 51 VAND. L. REV. 721, 736 (1998).
84. MS Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 947 (11th Cir. 1999) (citations and
quotation marks omitted).
85. Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 527 (5th Cir. 2000).
86. 10 F.3d at 753.
87. Id. at 755.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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division, "strip[ing] SSD of its employees and management and any
other separate operating status."90
Del Monte's purchase of SSD and its total absorption of SSD
into its own business brought into question SSD's performance under
the license agreement with Sunkist. 9 1 Del Monte and SSD filed a
declaratory relief action against Sunkist in the District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia, seeking a declaration that these
underlying controversies were subject to arbitration. 92 Sunkist filed
counterclaims against Del Monte, in response to which Del Monte filed
a motion to compel arbitration, claiming that "Sunkist was
contractually obligated to arbitrate its claims under the terms of the
license agreement."93 Sunkist objected, contending that it neither
94
consented to nor intended to arbitrate any claims with Del Monte.
Because Del Monte was not a signatory to the license agreement with
SSD, Sunkist contended, Del Monte had no written agreement with
Sunkist, and therefore Sunkist could not be compelled to arbitrate. 95
Under a theory of equitable estoppel, the Eleventh Circuit
dismissed Sunkist's arguments and compelled Sunkist, the unwilling
signatory, to arbitrate its claims with Del Monte. 96 Even though the
eleven counterclaims Sunkist had filed (arguably) sounded in tort, the
court nonetheless found that each counterclaim arose from and related
directly to the license agreement. 97 This close relationship to the
contract, coupled with the close relationship of the entities, led the
court to conclude that the claims were "intimately founded in and
intertwined with the license agreement,"98 thus precluding Sunkist
from avoiding arbitration.
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit was one of the first circuits to
apply the second strand of the equitable estoppel theory in Hughes
Masonry Co. v. Greater Clark County School Building Corp.;99 indeed,
the Sunkist district court directly relied on this analysis. 100 In Hughes,
90.
91.

Id.
Id.

(noting the "controversy relating to

SSD's performance

under the license

agreement").

92. Id. It does not appear, however, that Sunkist had yet filed suit; Del Monte and SSD
seemed to be acting preemptively.
93.

Id. at 755-56.

94.

Id. at 757.

95. Id.
96. Id. at 758.
97. Id. See also discussion infra Part IV.B.3.
98. Id. (quoting McBro Planning & Dev. Co. v. Triangle Elec. Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 342, 344
(11th Cir. 1984)).
99. Hughes Masonry Co. v. Greater Clark County Sch. Bldg. Corp., 659 F.2d 836 (7th Cir.
1981).
100. Sunkist, 10 F.3d at 757.
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the Hughes Masonry Company ("Hughes") entered into an agreement
with the Greater Clark County School Building Corporation ("Clark")
to provide masonry services for the construction of new middle
schools. 10 1 This agreement incorporated an agreement to arbitrate all
disputes arising out of the contract.'0 2 J.A. Construction Management
Corporation ("J.A.") was designated as construction manager for the
project.1 0 3 When Clark terminated its contract with Hughes due to
Hughes's alleged breach of its contractual obligations, Clark filed a
demand to arbitrate its dispute with Hughes.1 0 4 Hughes subsequently
filed separate actions against both Clark and J.A. in U.S. District
Court and in the Superior Court of Marion County, Indiana,
respectively.1 0 5 J.A. filed a motion to compel arbitration of all contract
disputes between itself, Hughes, and Clark, which the district court
denied. 10 6 J.A. appealed, and Hughes, the signatory to the agreement,
argued that it could not be required to arbitrate because J.A. was a
nonsignatory and therefore not entitled to invoke the arbitration
clause. 107
The Seventh Circuit, however, equitably estopped Hughes from
making this argument because "the very basis of Hughes' claim
against J.A. is that J.A. breached the duties and responsibilities
assigned and ascribed to J.A. by the agreement between Clark and
Hughes."1 08 The court overlooked the fact that Hughes had
characterized its complaint as sounding in tort because "[iun
substance... Hughes [was] attempting to hold J.A. to the terms of the
Hughes-Clark agreement."10 9 Instead, the court held that it would be
"manifestly inequitable" to permit Hughes to have it both ways: to rely
on the contract when it worked to its advantage and repudiate it when
it worked to its disadvantage. 110
Following the Hughes opinion, other circuits initially declined
to adopt this analysis. For example, in Thomson-CSF v. American
Arbitration Ass'n, the Second Circuit acknowledged that other courts
of appeal were adopting this alternative estoppel theory, in which the

101. Hughes, 659 F.2d at 837.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 838.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 839. Though generally I argue that the second strand of equitable estoppel is
invalid, the court in Hughes-Masonry may indeed have recognized the one isolated situation in
which the second strand may be valid. See discussion infra Part IV.B.3.
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courts were "willing to estop a signatory from avoiding arbitration
with a nonsignatory when the issues the nonsignatory [was] seeking
to resolve in arbitration [were] intertwined with the agreement that
the estoppel party has signed."1 1' 1 The Thomson court, however,
declined to adopt such a theory. The court recognized the distinction
between the two strands of estoppel, noting that other circuits had
used the second strand to compel signatories to arbitrate with willing
nonsignatories. 1 12 In the Thomson case, however, the signatory was
seeking to compel the nonsignatory to arbitrate, so the second strand
of equitable estoppel was inapplicable. Not only was it inapplicable to
the particular case, but the court recognized that the nature of
arbitration makes the distinction between the two forms of estoppel
important, reiterating that arbitration is "strictly a matter of
contract."1 13 The second strand of equitable estoppel was further
inapplicable because the nonsignatory could not be "estopped from
denying the existence of an arbitration clause to which it is a
signatory because no such clause exist[ed].114 The court, in essence,
stated that the second strand of equitable estoppel is used to estop
signatories who are trying to proceed in court from denying the
existence of an arbitration clause. The nonsignatory in the case could
not be estopped from denying the existence of such a clause, however,
because it had never signed a contract; therefore, no such clause
existed.
Not long after Thomson, however, the Second Circuit found a
situation in which to apply the so-called "alternative" estoppel
theory-the second strand-embraced in Sunkist and MS Dealers. In
Cogeneration
v.
Smith
Cogeneration Ltd.
Smith/Enron
1 1 5 Smith Cogeneration International ("SC") appealed
International,
from a district court order compelling arbitration of claims it asserted
in a lawsuit against Smith/Enron Cogeneration Limited Partnership,
Inc. ("SECLP").1 1 6 SCI was a signatory to a series of agreements
creating SECLP. 117 The agreements contained broad arbitration
clauses.' 1 8 When SCI filed suit against a number of Enron affiliates,"' 9
appellees SECLP and Enron International C.V. petitioned to compel

111. Thomson-CSF v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 64 F.3d 773, 779 (2d Cir. 1995).
112. Id.

113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. Id.

115. Smith/Enron Cogeneration Ltd. v. Smith Cogeneration Int'l, 198 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999).
116. Id. at 90.
117. Id.
118. Id.

119. Id. at 91.
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arbitration. 120 Thus the non-signatories to the agreement invited the
court to pierce their own corporate veil and compel arbitration. 121 The
district court granted the motion.122
SCI appealed, claiming that the there was no valid and
enforceable agreement to arbitrate between the parties to the
proceeding. 123 The court, however, found that the circumstances
justified piercing the corporate veil. 124 The case fell within the second
strand of equitable estoppel, a theory that the court had explicitly
declined to adopt in Thomson: namely, this was a circumstance in
which a signatory could be estopped from avoiding arbitration with
the nonsignatory because the potentially arbitrable issues were closely
intertwined with the signed agreement. 125 Having recognized the
second strand of equitable estoppel, the Second Circuit continues to
apply the doctrine. 126
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit recognizes the second strand of
equitable estoppel. In Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, the Fifth
Circuit explicitly adopted the Eleventh Circuit's language articulating
the two strands of equitable estoppel. 127 The Fifth Circuit applied the
second strand of equitable estoppel to compel two movie production
companies, who were signatories to the contract, to arbitrate their
claims with defendant nonsignatories. 128 The court opined that were it
not to compel the plaintiff signatories to arbitrate, it would "fly in the
129
face of fairness."'
The foregoing is a short discussion of the application of the
equitable estoppel theory in the circuit courts. As demonstrated by
these cases, circuit courts apply the second strand of equitable
estoppel. The following subsections will focus on some of the problems
underlying this approach.

120. Id.
121. Id. at 97. Even though this was an equitable estoppel theory case, the fact that the court
found that it justified piercing the corporate veil shows how courts will sometimes collapse the
veil-piercing factor and the second strand. See supra note 72. Both the collapsing and the
underlying "equitable" principles used to compel the unwilling signatory to arbitration are
improper.
122. Smith/Enron, 198 F.3d at 91.
123. Id. at 95.
124. Id. at 97.
125. Id. at 98.
126. See, e.g., JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2004); Choctaw
Generation Ltd. P'ship v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 271 F.3d 403 (2d Cir. 2001).
127. Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 527 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting
MS Dealer Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 947 (11th Cir. 1999)).
128. Id. at 525, 527-31.
129. Id. at 528.
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2. The Complication of Veil-Piercing/Alter Ego Theories
Courts often collapse the veil-piercing/alter ego theory with the
second strand of equitable estoppel. As this Note will argue, though
veil-piercing/alter ego can be a valid contract and agency principle
used to compel nonsignatories to arbitrate, the second strand of
equitable estoppel is not. Applying the second strand, even when
collapsed with the veil-piercing/alter ego principle, is an invalid means
of compelling arbitration of a nonsignatory because it is not grounded
in contract and agency principles.
The Third Circuit has, however unintentionally, collapsed
these two principles, thereby obfuscating the already nebulous
principle of equitable estoppel even further. In E.I. Dupont de
Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin Intermediates,
S.A.S., 130 the Third Circuit acknowledged in dicta the equitable
estoppel theory, 131 which it had never applied before, though it
declined to apply it to the particular facts. The court did not, however,
preclude the doctrine from being applied in future cases: "[T]here
appears to be no reason why, in an appropriate case, we would refrain
from [applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel]."'132 The court
acknowledged two theories: situations in which the nonsignatory
knowingly exploits the agreement (the first strand), and situations in
which the signatory is bound to arbitrate because of the close
relationship and the fact that the claims were intertwined (the second
strand). 133 The court noted that when the signatory is compelled to
arbitrate due to the close relationship, "[i]n essence, a non-signatory
voluntarily pierces its own veil to arbitrate claims against a signatory
that are derivative of its corporate-subsidiary's claims against the
34
same signatory."'
Acknowledging that the nonsignatory voluntarily pierced its
own veil complicates the matter. 35 In so doing, the Third Circuit
improperly collapsed the veil-piercing principle into the equitable
36
estoppel analysis, when the two properly should be distinct theories.'
The court stated,
With reference to the second theory of equitable estoppel, appellants rely on a series of
cases in which signatories were held to arbitrate related claims against parent

130. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin Intermediates, S.A.S.,
269 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2001).
131. Id. at 199-202.
132. Id. at 199.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 201.
135. See supra note 72.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 72.
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companies who were not signatories to the arbitration clause.... In essence, a
nonsignatory voluntarily pierces its own veil to arbitrate claims against a signatory
that
137
are derivative of its corporate-subsidiary's claims against the same signatory.

Appellants argued that though the cases cited would bind a
signatory plaintiff to arbitration, nevertheless they were applicable
and would bind a nonsignatory plaintiff. The court rejected this
argument, but in so doing, it managed to confuse the principles of veilpiercing/alter ego and both strands of equitable estoppel. The court
failed to acknowledge that equitable estoppel is distinct from the
principle of veil-piercing/alter ego. This is not the second strand of
equitable estoppel; rather, it is a case of a signatory defendant
compelling a parent corporation to arbitrate because its domination
and control of the nonsignatory render them effectively the same
entity. As discussed above, if the parent company meets the requisite
standard of domination and control, a nonsignatory parent company
can compel a signatory plaintiff to arbitrate. This is so because the
parent company, as an alter-ego of the subsidiary, is a signatory to the
contract. By failing to recognize the distinction between the two
theories, as well as failing to undertake an analysis of domination and
control, the Third Circuit confused the second strand of estoppel even
138
further.
3. Recasting a Complaint in Tort as Sounding in Contract
The second strand of equitable estoppel also suffers from the
courts' eagerness to recast tort complaints as sounding in contract. It
is true that a party cannot avoid broad language in an arbitration
agreement by cleverly attempting to cast its complaint in tort rather
than contract (an attempt that, if successful, would render the

137. E.I Dupont, 269 F.3d at 201.
138. The court made further mistakes in its analysis. The Third Circuit quoted the Thomson
court, stating:
As these cases indicate, the circuits have been willing to estop a signatory
from avoiding arbitration with a nonsignatory when the issues the
nonsignatory is seeking to resolve in arbitration are intertwined with the
agreement that the estopped party has signed. As the district court pointed
out, however, 'the situation here is the inverse: E&S, the signatory, seeks to
compel Thomson, a non-signatory.'
Id. at 202 (quoting Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 64 F.3d 773,779 (2d Cir. 1995)).
The court acknowledged that the second strand of equitable estoppel is valid-that a signatory
may be estopped if the "issues are intertwined"-even though this may not be sufficient to
constitute an agreement to arbitrate. As this Note argues, however, the second strand of estoppel
is not valid and there is no agreement to arbitrate. The court also invalidated the first strand of
estoppel in stating that a signatory defendant may not be able to compel a nonsignatory plaintiff.
This Note argues, however, that the first strand is valid. Moreover, under the other four
principles, a signatory defendant may compel a nonsignatory plaintiff to arbitrate.
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contractual provisions irrelevant). 139 Furthermore, in certain cases the
pleadings truly were based in contract. For example, in Hughes
Masonry, in the first count of its amended complaint, Hughes pleaded
that "Clark and/or its construction manager" (the nonsignatory) were
in default of the Hughes-Clark agreement. 140 Though the third count
sounded in tort, the court determined that the acts that Hughes
alleged were essentially failure to perform duties described in the
Hughes-Clark contract.1 41 Hughes had merely attempted to
characterize the nonsignatory's alleged failures to perform duties
under the contract as tortious interferences with its contractual
relations with Clark. 142 This therefore may be the rare isolated case
where it is acceptable to use the second strand of equitable estoppel to
compel an unwilling signatory to arbitrate with a willing signatory. 143
Yet the Hughes-Masonry situation is the exception to the norm,
since typically in situations involving a signatory and a nonsignatory
there is no contractual relationship. Thus pure tort claims are
appropriate, and courts should not be so eager to recast the claims in
contract just to compel the parties to arbitrate. The second strand of
equitable estoppel is distinct from the other legitimate principles
because it focuses on the nature of the parties' relationship. Even
though there might be a close circumstantial connection to the
contract, this does not mean that the cause of action is based on duties
arising out of the contract itself.
For example, in McBro Planning & Development Co. v.
Triangle Electrical Construction Co., Triangle pleaded its claims in
tort counts-intentional interference with contract and negligenceclaiming that McBro had harassed and hampered its work.1 44 The two
parties did not have a written arbitration agreement between
themselves, yet each party had contracted with St. Margaret's

139. McBro Planning & Dev. Co. v. Triangle Elec. Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 342, 344 (11th Cir.
1984).

140. Hughes Masonry Co. v. Greater Clark County Sch. Bldg. Corp., 659 F.2d 836, 839 (7th
Cir. 1981).
141. Id. at 840.

142. Id.
143. Because there was in fact a failure to perform contractual duties, the use of estoppel
was not a false attempt to transform the nature of the relationship into a contractual one; rather,
the relationship was already contractual in nature. In the typical use of the second strand,
however, a court uses the doctrine in a weak attempt to characterize the relationship as
contractual, where in fact, as this Note argues, it is not. Because of the inherent contractual
relationship in the Hughes case, which was merely a function of the particular facts of the case,
compulsion of arbitration was thus proper.
144. McBro, 741 F.2d at 343. A contract count under a third-party beneficiary theory was
subsequently dropped. Id.
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Hospital regarding hospital renovations and additions. Both of these
145
contracts contained written arbitration agreements.
This is a clear example of a tort case, and yet the court decided
that the close relationship of the three parties warranted arbitration
under the two separate contracts. 146 The court disregarded the fact
that the Triangle-St. Margaret contract explicitly stated that "nothing
contained in the Contract documents shall create any contractual
relationship between the Construction Manager [McBro] and the
Contractor [Triangle]." 147 A court should hesitate before it recasts a
tort pleading as a contract pleading in order to compel the parties to
arbitrate. Recasting a tort pleading as a contract pleading without the
necessary analysis of whether there was truly an agreement does not
satisfy the requirement of an agreement to arbitrate.
Furthermore, while it is true that even a tort claim could be
arbitrated under the arbitration clause, the court must still undertake
the analysis of whether there was a contractual agreement to
arbitrate. The mere fact that the close relationship of the parties
involved may be related circumstantially to a contract does not mean
that there was a sufficient contractual agreement. Therefore, a court
cannot circumvent the fundamental necessity of an arbitration
agreement simply by manipulating the form of the pleadings.
Regardless of whether the claim sounds in tort or contract, before a
court can compel parties to arbitrate, it must analyze the relationship
of the parties to the contract to determine whether there was an
agreement to arbitrate.

145. Id. at 342.
146. Id. at 342-43.
147. Id. at 343 (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, in recasting the complaint as a
contract claim, the McBro court gave great weight to the fact that Triangle had originally
pleaded a third-party beneficiary claim, which sounds in contract, even though Triangle later
amended its pleadings. Id. at 342. By giving such evidentiary weight to a withdrawn pleading,
the court effectively rendered amended pleadings worthless. Some circuits, however, have
properly recognized that the original complaint has very limited significance. For example, in
Intergen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134 (1st Cir. 2003), none of the parties to the case was a
signatory to any of the five agreements associated with the complaint. Id. at 143. Defendants
moved to compel arbitration, and plaintiffs claimed that they had neither signed any of the
underlying contracts nor agreed to arbitrate the claims asserted in the complaint. Id. at 140.
Defendants tried to argue an equitable estoppel theory, focusing on an allegation made only in
the original complaint that plaintiff was " 'the successor to all rights of predecessor entities
related to the actions and omissions alleged.' " Id. at 145. The court rejected this argument on
the basis that original complaints have very limited significance in litigation. Id. After
examining the facts, the court declined to apply equitable estoppel because the plaintiffs did not
embrace the contracts or seek to derive direct benefits from this. Id. at 146. This would be the
first strand of equitable estoppel. After considering other arguments for why the parties should
be compelled to arbitrate their dispute, the motion to compel arbitration was denied. Id. at 150.
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4. Entitlement to Invoke the Arbitration Clause and Lack of an
Agreement to Arbitrate
The fundamental problem with the second strand of equitable
estoppel, notwithstanding the aforementioned complications, is that a
nonsignatory is not entitled to invoke the arbitration clause because
there is no mutual agreement to arbitrate, the fundamental requisite
for arbitration. 148 As the First Circuit stated in Intergen N.V. v. Grina,
a party who attempts to compel arbitration must show that he is
entitled to invoke the arbitration clause. 149 This highlights what may
be the biggest problem with the second strand of the equitable
estoppel doctrine: the party invoking the arbitration clause is not
entitled to invoke it. Under the other four theories (incorporation by
reference, assumption, agency, and veil-piercing/alter ego), as well as
the first strand of equitable estoppel, it is the signatory, clearly a
party entitled to invoke the clause, who invokes it. Yet, as the Fifth
Circuit noted, "As a general rule, an arbitration clause cannot be
invoked by a non-party to the arbitration contract.1' 5 0 The nonsignatory is not entitled because "[t]he right to compel arbitration
stems from a contractual right."1 5' A nonsignatory who was not a
party to the agreement, as evidenced by a signature to the contract or
under the principles of contractual interpretation or agency law, is
therefore not entitled to invoke the arbitration clause.
Under the second strand of the equitable estoppel theory,
courts examine the nature of the relationship between the parties, not
the relationship to the contract and the duties and obligations arising
out of traditional contract or agency principles. The courts do,
however, pay lip service to the relationship being "intimately founded
in and intertwined with the underlying contract obligations."'1 52
Typically, the relationship is circumstantially related to the contract,
rather than arising out of the contractual agreement itself. Without a
contractual relationship, the nonsignatory is not entitled to invoke the
arbitration clause; therefore, the second strand of equitable estoppel is
an improper basis for compelling arbitration.

148. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); e.g., AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643,
648 (1986). This is distinct from the first strand. This Note argues that, in the first strand, the
nonsignatory indeed has manifested an objective intent to arbitrate its claims. See discussion
supra Part IV.A.
149. Intergen, 344 F.3d at 142.
150. Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 532 (5th Cir. 2000) (Dennis, J.,
dissenting).
151. Britton v. Co-Op Banking Group, 4 F.3d 742, 744 (9th Cir. 1993).
152. Hughes Masonry Co. v. Greater Clark County Sch. Bldg. Corp., 659 F.2d 836, 841 n.9
(7th Cir. 1981).
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Furthermore, even though there is a federal policy in favor of
arbitration, only parties that agreed to arbitrate may be forced to
arbitrate.153 Even a strong federal policy in favor of arbitration cannot
go so far as to compel parties to arbitrate when they never agreed to in
the first place, whether the agreement is evidenced by an explicit
contract or whether it is objectively manifested by other means
recognized under general contractual principles. As Sawrie noted,
Assent to arbitrate a broad range of disputes, however, does not necessarily signify
assent to arbitrate those disputes with nonsignatories. Even if a party agreed to
arbitrate a long range of disputes arising under a contract, that party might reasonably
argue that it specifically agreed to arbitrate those disputes only with other contracting
parties. 154

The policy justifications for equitable estoppel unveil further
problems. "Equitable estoppel is intended to prevent a party from
taking unconscionable advantage of its own wrong by asserting its
strict legal rights."'15 5 But in the scope of compulsion to arbitrate, is it
really unconscionable to send a party to court rather than arbitration?
In court, parties gain the protections of formal rules of evidence and
civil procedure, stare decisis, and public opinions. 156 Furthermore, in
the classic situation in which the circuit courts apply the second
strand of the doctrine, the signatory files suit in district court and the
"willing" nonsignatory files a motion to compel arbitration. By filing
suit, the signatory is trying to prove that it was wronged-not take
advantage of its own wrong.
This is not to say that the entire doctrine of equitable estoppel
is a misplaced theory. There are policy reasons supporting at least the
first strand of the theory. 157 We should encourage parties to act
consistently and not take unfair advantage of the other party. Yet the
use of the second strand of the doctrine to compel unwilling
signatories to arbitrate has been stretched too far beyond the
boundaries of contract interpretation principles. Courts have extended
the federal policy in favor of arbitration to compel the unwilling
153. Intergen, 344 F.3d at 142.
154. Sawrie, supra note 83, at 730.
155. 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver § 30 (2006).

156 See discussion supra Part II.B.
157. For an interesting discussion of equitable estoppel proposing an opposing view, see J.
Douglas Uloth & J. Hamilton Rial, III, Equitable Estoppel as a Basis for Compelling
Nonsignatoriesto Arbitrate - A Bridge Too Far?,21 REV. LITIG. 593 (2002). Uloth and Rial argue
that the second strand is the proper application of equitable estoppel: "[E]quitable estoppel
applies only when a nonsignatory defendant seeks to compel arbitration with a signatory
plaintiff." Id. at 633 (emphasis added). Even though Uloth and Rial recognize that the expansion
of equitable estoppel might dwarf the "fundamental premise that a party cannot be compelled to
arbitrate a matter without its agreement," id. at 632, they argue that it is unreasonable for a
party who has signed nothing to find himself compelled to arbitrate its claims, and that the
expansion of two theories of equitable estoppel might have constitutional implications. Id. at 633.

2007]

EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL

739

signatories to arbitrate, even when there was no agreement to
arbitrate, written or otherwise, inferred from traditional contract
interpretation.
The second strand of the equitable estoppel doctrine thus is
fraught with inconsistencies and poor reasoning that should make
courts hesitant to apply it, not more eager to do so. In particular, the
focus on the nonsignatory is misplaced. A nonsignatory may not
validly compel a signatory to arbitrate when the signatory wishes to
sue.15. 8 The nonsignatory is not entitled to invoke the written
agreement, even though the signatory may be entitled to invoke it
against the nonsignatory. 159 There is no reason why a nonsignatory
who did not enter into a written agreement with the signatory should
nevertheless have the power to compel the signatory to arbitrate.
Courts also improperly blur the delineation between the
equitable estoppel doctrine and the other four principles by which a
court can compel a nonsignatory to arbitrate. Courts' eagerness to
recast tort claims as sounding in contract in order to circumvent the
requirement of an agreement to arbitrate extends the equitable
estoppel doctrine beyond its appropriate limits. Furthermore, the
circuit courts have stretched the second strand of equitable estoppel so
thin that they are compelling parties to arbitrate even absent an
arbitration agreement
The doctrine of equitable estoppel must therefore be
refashioned to conform to traditional principles of contract and agency
law.
V. SOLUTION: ERADICATING THE SECOND STRAND OF EQUITABLE
ESTOPPEL TO MAINTAIN VALID CONTRACT AND AGENCY LAW
PRINCIPLES

One commentator has argued that preventing courts from
compelling arbitration unless the parties agreed to arbitrate conflicts
with the expansive enforcement policy of federal arbitration law. 160

158. By this is a nonsignatory in the truest sense of the word-in other words, the principle
of incorporation by reference is still valid. As stated above, under the principle of incorporation
by reference, a "nonsignatory" to the contract being incorporated may be entitled to compel the
signatory to arbitration. But by incorporating by reference, the nonsignatory effectively becomes
a signatory to the first contract, at least with regard to claims it can raise against the party with
whom it is contracting. See discussion supra Part III.A.
159. When a signatory is being sued by a nonsignatory, it is entitled to invoke the agreement
and compel the nonsignatory to arbitration under any theory of the five part framework:
incorporation by reference, assumption, agency, veil-piercing/alter ego, or the first strand of
equitable estoppel. This necessarily results in an asymmetry, in that the signatory is entitled to
invoke the clause against the nonsignatory, and not vice versa.
160. Sawrie, supranote 83, at 726.
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"To resolve this conflict, federal courts have applied theories such
as... equitable estoppel to strike an appropriate balance.' 1 6 1 Yet
there is no need to strike an "appropriate balance"; indeed, doing so
would subvert the FAA's plain words. Despite the strong policy in
favor of arbitration, contract principles should always trump. The
FAA itself requires an agreement to arbitrate before a court can
162
compel a party to arbitrate.
Although the first strand of equitable estoppel comports with
the FAA's plain meaning, the second strand does not. The first strand
of equitable estoppel, under which the courts examine whether a
plaintiff-nonsignatory is exploiting the contract to his benefit such
that there is sufficient objective intent to arbitrate, is consistent with
this notion that the contract principles should trump. But those courts
that have used the second strand of equitable estoppel to examine the
parties' relationship to one another overreach by elevating the policy
in favor of arbitration even above traditional contract principles. As
one commentator noted, the Grigson court "conformed to the liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration."'' 63 Yet the commentator also
conceded that "[t]he Grigson court applied the doctrine of equitable
estoppel to allow a nonsignatory to a contract to compel arbitration
against a party who neither contractually agreed to arbitration,nor
submitted to arbitration with the nonsignatory."' 64 This is illustrative
of cases in which courts apply the second strand of equitable estoppel.
Indeed, these courts will go so far as to compel an unwilling signatory
to arbitrate with a willing signatory even when the connection
between the claim and the contract is weak. 65 Despite their eagerness
to effectuate the federal policy in favor of arbitration, courts cannot
66
overlook the requirement that there be an agreement to arbitrate.

161. Id.
162. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006). Section 4 provides that a party aggrieved by a failure to arbitrate
under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court with
appropriate jurisdiction to order arbitration in the manner provided for in the agreement. Id.
Courts of course have not confined this to written agreements, but instead have applied
traditional contract and agency principles to determine whether there was an agreement to
arbitrate. See, e.g., McAllister Bros., Inc. v. A & S Transp. Co., 621 F.2d 519, 524 (2d Cir. 1980)
("[A] party may be bound by an agreement to arbitrate even in the absence of a signature.").
163. Holly M. Roberts, Casenote, Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency: Signatories "Can't Have
it Both Ways" - Nonsignatories to a Contract Agreement Now Have Standing to Compel
Arbitration,47 LOY. L. REV. 963, 978 (2001). Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C. is a Fifth
Circuit case adopting the equitable estoppel theory that the Eleventh Circuit articulated in MS
Dealers. Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 527 (5th Cir. 2000).
164. Id. at 977-78 (emphasis added).
165. Sawrie, supra note 83, at 741.
166. In finding such an agreement, courts must use the traditional rules of contract
interpretation. "One important constraint [on the] federal policy favoring arbitration [is that the
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Therefore, the focus of the "equitable estoppel" doctrine in
determining whether to compel a nonsignatory to arbitrate should be
realigned to one relationship only: The relationship of the
nonsignatory to the contract. To implement this realignment, courts
should completely eliminate the use of the second strand of equitable
estoppel. Focusing merely on the relationship between the two parties
ignores the most important element of arbitration: an agreement to
arbitrate. This agreement arises out of an alignment of objectively
manifested intent to be bound by the contract. Under the other
theories by which a nonsignatory can be compelled to arbitrateincorporation by reference, assumption, agency, and veil piercing/alter
ego-there is such an alignment. The signatory's intent to be bound by
the contract is manifested in the contract itself, and the
nonsignatory's intent is objectively manifested through the traditional
contract and agency principles. Courts effectively assign the
nonsignatory the requisite intent based on these principles. Similarly,
for the first strand of equitable estoppel, the nonsignatory has
manifested its objective intent to be bound by the contract. If the
nonsignatory has directly benefited from and embraced the contract,
yet then tries to exploit his position by suing on the contract, it follows
that he should be held to the terms of the contract-and thus
compelled to arbitrate.
With the second strand of equitable estoppel, however, there is
not always the same alignment of objectively manifested intent to be
bound by the contract. Oftentimes the signatory is suing in tort, which
in part demonstrates the lack of a contractual relationship between
the two parties. 16 7 Furthermore, the nonsignatory has not necessarily
manifested the intent to be bound by the contract itself-it has simply
stated that it is willing to proceed in arbitration. Even if it were
willing to be bound by the contract, there is still the problem of the
signatory's lack of assent, and thus absence of a mutual agreement.
Notwithstanding the propriety of the first strand of equitable estoppel,
under which a signatory can compel a nonsignatory who is exploiting
the benefits of the contract to arbitrate the dispute, the equitable
estoppel doctrine should not work in the opposite direction: only the
signatory is entitled to invoke the arbitration clause. In the instance of
a mere relationship between the parties, not contractual in nature, the
signatory should be allowed to proceed in court if he so chooses.
Advocates of the second strand of equitable estoppel have
argued that the signatory is acting with "unacceptable motives" by
policy] does not totally displace ordinary rules of contract interpretation." Paul Revere Variable
Annuity Ins. Co. v. Kirschhofer, 226 F.3d 15, 25 (1st Cir. 2000).
167. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3.
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adding a nonsignatory defendant to a claim. 168 This so-called "artful
circumnavigation" of arbitration by suing a nonsignatory allegedly
thwarts the federal policy in favor of arbitration. An equitable
estoppel theory allowing the compulsion of the unwilling signatory to
arbitrate therefore is warranted, despite the absence of an agreement
to arbitrate. 169 Yet, this argument is rather weak. First, a signatory
suing a nonsignatory isn't absolutely dodging its obligations under the
written agreement. If the signatory were to sue the other signatory,
the two parties would undoubtedly move to arbitrate under the
agreement. Yet the mere fact that the signatory is arbitrating with the
other signatory does not mean that it should have to arbitrate its
dispute with a nonsignatory, a party with whom it did not negotiate
and contract to arbitrate. Second, what if the signatory is not trying to
be clever and thwart the court system, but has a truly valid claim
against the nonsignatory? Though arbitration is an attractive option,
there are reasons why a party would want its dispute to be heard in a
court, rather than by an arbitrator. 170 An innocent signatory should
not have to give up its right to a judicial hearing with a nonsignatory.
Most importantly, arguments in favor of the second strand fail
because they disregard the first and foremost requirement for
arbitration: an agreement to arbitrate. Though it may appear that the
signatory is acting with unacceptable motives, the doctrine of
equitable estoppel is not the proper vehicle to deal with the situation.
Because there simply is no agreement to arbitrate, the courts cannot
compel the signatory to arbitrate, regardless of the signatory's
motives.
Furthermore, the fact that the signatory expended the time
and effort to negotiate with the other signatory might show its
preference for contracting. The focus of the relationship between the
nonsignatory and the signatory allows courts to bypass the signatory's
efforts in negotiating a contract. Parties take the time and effort to
put their agreement in writing in part because they fear losing those
negotiated rights in the future. Courts should not disregard the fact
that the signatory wanted to protect certain rights vis . vis the other
signatory. We can infer, from the lack of a contract with the
nonsignatory, that the signatory wished to leave certain contingencies
open. Perhaps most importantly, the fact that the signatory did not
168. Id. at 731 ("Intuition supports the.., argument that the plaintiff cannot dodge
arbitration by adding a nonsignatory defendant to the complaint.").
169. Id.
170. For example, parties usually have a choice as to the arbitrator, which raises a real
possibility of bias. A party may want an impartial judge to hear the dispute so as to eliminate
this possibility of bias. Arbitration also eliminates the possibility of appeal, and the arbitrator
may in effect escape from the rules of stare decisis and established precedent.
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negotiate an arbitration clause with the nonsignatory, despite its
agreement with the other signatory, seems to demonstrate that it
wanted to protect its right to proceed in court with respect to the
nonsignatory.
Therefore, a complete elimination of the second strand of
equitable estoppel will validate the compulsion of nonsignatories to
arbitrate. Because it completely disregards whether there was an
agreement to arbitrate, the second strand of equitable estoppel is not a
valid principle by which courts can compel a nonsignatory to arbitrate.
In the absence of the other four principles by which a court can compel
a nonsignatory to arbitrate, or even a situation in which the first
strand of equitable estoppel is applicable, the claim must remain in
court.
VI. CONCLUSION

Despite a federal policy in favor of arbitration, brought about
by the enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act, there is a
fundamental requirement that must be met before a court can compel
parties to arbitrate: The parties must have agreed to arbitrate their
dispute. Otherwise, the claim must remain in court.
Agreement to arbitrate, however, can be manifested in many
different ways, and as demonstrated above, even nonsignatories to a
written agreement may have agreed to arbitrate with the signatories.
Whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate is typically a
consideration for the courts. To ascertain whether such an agreement
exists, the courts are bound only by traditional contract principles.
When the dispute includes a nonsignatory, courts use five factors to
interpret whether agreement exists: incorporation by reference,
assumption, agency, veil-piercing/alter ego, and equitable estoppel.
Over time, however, courts have been so eager to effectuate the federal
policy in favor of arbitration that they have forgotten the most
important prerequisite for compelling arbitration: an agreement to
arbitrate. Thus, courts have used the equitable estoppel theory to
compel plaintiff-signatories to arbitrate, improperly disregarding the
fundamental need for a contractual agreement between the two
parties to arbitrate.
To resolve this problem, the second strand of equitable estoppel
should be wholly eliminated. This will constrain the courts and ensure
that only parties who agreed to arbitrate are required to do so.
Arbitration may be attractive to some parties, but the judicial forum is
still preferential to others. Courts must avoid exploiting their powers
by compelling parties to arbitrate as a means by which to clear their
own dockets. Eliminating the second strand will properly effectuate
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the parties' intent and properly implement the Federal Arbitration
Act.
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